Apple Previews Restrictions to Full Disk Access Coming in MacOS ⇥ support.apple.com

As foreshadowed in October, Apple is making changes to the ways users may grant to an application fuller permissions in MacOS, as explained in a new support document:

When you give an app Full Disk Access instead of choosing only specific protected folders for it to access, it can bypass system protections and access all of the files on your Mac, including your messages, emails, photos and videos, data from other user accounts, and more. It can read, change, delete, and export this data without asking.

When you give an app System & App Protection Override, you can choose specific apps for it to control. If you allow it to bypass system protections instead, it can fully control your Mac and apps, which allows it to access all of your data. It can also see every window and app, including ones in the background, and capture every keystroke.

Apps that request Full Disk Access will now throw a dialog box that reads “your Mac will no longer be able to keep your data private and secure if you allow this app to bypass system protections to turn on Full Disk Access”, which sounds very scary indeed, but it also allows you to grant access to specific folders. This seems like an improvement overall. Sometimes, an application does not actually need full disk access, but it does need broader permissions than the system typically allows. Giving permission to access specific folders is now the default action of the dialog box thrown by a Full Disk Access request.

The other option, aside from Cancel, now reads “Bypass System Protections”. Apple does not show an example of this second stage, but Juli Clover, of MacRumors, has a preview. I think it makes apps requesting access look like malware. The way it works is that you need to click three different “OK” buttons with red text, kind of like initialing beside each paragraph in a legal document, acknowledging you are granting full access to all your messages, emails, and photos, and allowing an app to potentially “browse as you […] including bank and medical accounts”. It is only if you click “OK” to all three buttons that you can then click the “Turn On Full Disk Access” button, also set in red text.

Despite the “Bypass System Protections” button, this is not the more extreme “System & App Protection Override” feature. Per a developer news post, that is a product of splitting “Device Control and Data Access into two settings: (1) System & App Protection Override, and (2) Accessibility”. There are many third-party apps that use accessibility features to take actions across the system, but are not specifically “accessibility apps” like screen readers. Those are now separated. Apps that request “System & App Protection Override” will prompt the user — in addition to the same permissions as Full Disk Access — to acknowledge the app can now control the computer and “read and monitor everything”.

This could do as Apple intends and stop some less informed users from doing something dangerous to their computer. But if you need to grant what Apple calls “extraordinary access” to normal utilities, it might also dilute the message of these prompts. Unclack is a tiny app which requires persistent key input monitoring to mute the system audio input when typing on, say, a loud mechanical keyboard. Apple would probably say there is simply no good way to automatically, technically, differentiate between that and something like a keylogger. But there are only so many dialog boxes and scary notices that can be placed between a user and a system. The very concept of “Full Disk Access” is precisely because MacOS has had a permissions dialog for a function that, a decade or so ago, was just how computers worked. Things change.

But you can bet you will not need to jump through hoops to give Siri access to all the same stuff. While I worry these restrictions will be a barrier for third-party software adoption, Federico Viticci thinks they might do the opposite, giving people the control to “restrict those apps to specific locations on their Macs, while still being able to use those apps […] assuming companies like Meta and OpenAI agree to support Apple’s new Full Disk Access settings”. I had not thought of it in that way. But I think there will still be types of information for which there is no substitute for Full Disk Access. Also, Apple is apparently making aggressive strides toward agentic capabilities in Siri. If the built-in, zero-configuration option already has access to your entire personal context, why would most normal users risk something that can “read and monitor everything” in a negative way?

Also, Jason Aten, at Inc, managed to find time to cover these updates. He still has not acknowledged that he must have enabled Full Disk Access for Meta’s Muse agent to have uploaded his Messages database.